














Production  of Space in Traditional Towns 
and Villages against  the Backdrop of 
“Chinese Characteristics”: A Study  of 










Traditional towns and villages in China have experienced profound formal transforma- 
tion in recent years as a result of national political policies promoting rural development. 
By analyzing how this new production of space reflects efforts to achieve “Socialism with 
Chinese characteristics,” this report seeks to understand its underlying mechanisms and 
their relation to issues of tradition. Using the region of Huizhou in Anhui province as site 
for examination, the report examines forces driving change from a number of directions: 
from the “top-down” by government, by local people from the “bottom-up,” and in terms 
of design-led interventions from the “middle.”  It concludes that the contextual production 
of space in Huizhou is being compromised, and that Huizhou building traditions are in 
decline, being inherited only in fragments. And it calls for a more active role by designers 







In China, areas outside of cities have witnessed considerable development over the past few 
decades, and they have recently become the focus of national policies aimed at revitalizing 
rural areas in pursuit  of urban-rural integration.1    This has brought a profound transfor- 
mation of the physical form of traditional towns and villages (which will be referred to here 
as part of the rural areas of which they are a part).2    This transformation has complicated 
issues of tradition, and it is crucial that architects and urban designers understand these 
changes in a more comprehensive way. However, within the design disciplines in China 





In research on Chinese cities, knowledge on urban stud- 
ies imported from the West has helped designers engage with 
sociology, while the introduction of systematic urban planning 
methods has contributed  to the integration  of this approach 
into design practice.3   Yet, with regard to rural areas this 
engagement is minimal,  and conventional approaches still 
predominate.4   This report aims to fill this gap by taking the 
debate over changing rural forms as a point of departure,  and 
by developing an analytical mode that seeks to understand the 
production  of rural space as a result of “Socialism with Chi- 
nese characteristics.”  Using the region of Huizhou in Anhui 
province in eastern China as a point of reference, this will en- 
able a better understanding of contextual form transformation 
and related issues of tradition.  To support this discussion, 
two types of development will be examined in depth based on 
research incorporating firsthand examination of archival ma- 
terials, in-depth interviews, and on-site observations. 
	
	
T H E R U R A L F O R M P R O B L E M A N D “C H I N E S E 
C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S ” 
	
Since 1998 the Chinese government has enacted a series of 
policies supporting the development of rural areas, includ- 
ing “Building a New Socialist Countryside,” “Construction 
of Beautiful Village,” “New-Type Urbanization,” and “Rural 
Revitalization.”5   These policies have aimed to break a dualis- 
tic structure in approaches to rural and urban development. 
On the one hand, the effort appears motivated by the central 
government’s desire to “pay back” rural areas that had previ- 
ously been exploited by industrialization.6   But it has also been 
intended  to alleviate the global and domestic economic crisis 
by using the resiliency of rural areas as a reservoir to absorb an 
over-accumulation of capital — for example, through the con- 
struction of new physical properties for rural tourism.  Overall, 
it can also be interpreted as part of a stabilization strategy, 
intended to create opportunities and incentives for rural people 
to remain in towns and villages.7   This strategy, however, has 
led to a huge increase in the construction of fixed capital assets, 
which is transforming the character of rural places ( f i g . 1 ) .8 
The significance of this political campaign has also 
struck a chord with designers and other professionals  who 
see it as a great opportunity to support rural areas through 
design.  A growing number of them are thus focusing on the 
rural areas, even if their theoretical knowledge is often in con- 
flict with local realities of space and form.  This may be seen, 
for example, in their approaches to building configuration, 
settlement layout, and urban form.9   These trends have placed 
a spotlight on the need for a better understanding of physical 
form in rural areas (referred to as “rural form” in this report). 
Conventional approaches to “space and form” are often 
problematic, especially in China.  Indeed, Chinese urban 
planning  often emphasizes a macro, political view that relies 
on economics and political science.  It thus serves primarily 
as a regulation-setting instrument, with little concern for 
detailed issues of urban form.10    Architectural visions, mean- 
while, are often overly individualized, leading to a formal 
anarchy that fails to respect authentic  local voices.11   Urban 
design as a discipline has also only recently been introduced, 
so that its position, significance and application within the 
system of Chinese planning  is still contested, and its essence 























f i g ur e  1 .  The shrinking 
traditional settlements and 
expanding modern residential 
districts of Huizhou. 






Shifting design attention to rural areas makes this sce- 
nario even more challenging, because deep contradictions 
may surface between planning  methods  and existing local 
traditions.  The divides between various stakeholders  (local/ 
central government, global/domestic capital, and the local 
population) are also typically wider than in urban areas.  De- 
signers may thus face unprecedented and complicated prob- 
lems in rural areas navigating between local contexts and 
ingrained  professional attitudes. 
Rural contexts also cannot escape the impact of the larger 
national discourse of “Socialism with Chinese charac- 
teristics.”  Indeed, the ongoing transformation of rural form 
in China cannot be fully understood apart from it.  “Social- 
ism with Chinese characteristics” is an inclusive concept that 
was first formulated  in the 1980s to guide the country’s de- 
velopment and distinguish it both from “Capitalism from the 
West” and “Socialism from the Soviet Union.”13    But the con- 
cept has continually evolved and been modified to the present 
day.14   Some scholars have thus described it as the “theoretical 
innovation and practical innovation of Marxism and scientific 
socialism” in response to evolving Chinese reality.15 
In line with such a view, this report attempts to explain 
rural form transformation in Huizhou as a result of changing 
contextual realities of space production  derived from the ap- 
plication of “Chinese characteristics.”  In rural areas, the cur- 
rent relevant realities of “Chinese characteristics” are, first, 
the institution of a socialist market economy and, second, 
new polices for revitalization and governance.  All these fac- 
tors highlight the new principal contradiction  facing Chinese 
society: that between unbalanced and inadequate  develop- 
ment and the people’s ever-growing desire for a better life in 
keeping with a confidence in culture and tradition that is part 
of the national narrative.16 
	
	
I N V O LV E M E N T O F T H E D E S I G N D I S C I P L I N E S I N 
P R O B L E M S O F R U R A L F O R M 
	
With regard to rural areas, classical architectural  practice in 
China has typically adopted a descriptive approach.  It has 
thus mainly focused on surveys, mapping,  and the conserva- 
tion of vernacular architecture  or settlements, as well as anal- 
yses of structural  tectonics and environmental performance 
( f i g . 2 ) .17   New technologies such as digital construction 
have also been employed recently, but their use has generally 
been limited to the production  of fashionable expressions.18 
In addition, some scholars have adopted an anthropological 
approach to underlying factors of rural form evolution, al- 
though their work has tended to focus on historical accounts, 
































f i g u r e  2 .  A typological mapping 
of ancient Huizhou  building techniques 
from the study by Southeast University. 
Drawings and photos courtesy of Gong Kai
 





have, however, begun to explore contemporary  conditions and 
sought to analyze rural construction processes as a way to 
interrogate  the genuine  meaning  of changing local forms.20 
From government regulatory and planning  perspectives, 
the approach to issues of rural form is still largely defined 
by the macro view of “rural planning” identified in the 2007 
“Urban and Rural Planning  Law.”21  Compared to urban plan- 
ning, the systems and procedures  described there for rural 
planning  are far less clear; indeed, they basically involve the 
transposition of urban planning  methods  to rural areas ac- 
cording to a top-down approach.22   Fortunately, the role of the 
rural planner has recently been introduced  and includes an 
admonition to listen to the “local voice.” However, rural plan- 
ning has also been incorporated  into an emerging  “National 
Territory Spatial Planning  System,” and its repositioning and 
even redefinition  within this new overarching frame are still 
underway.23   Rural planning  is thus still primarily driven by 
a top-down approach, with little detailed, grounded  formal 
design yet to be successfully achieved.  This gap in practice 
is similar to that which it has long been hoped urban design 
would bridge in cities.  However, the application of urban 
design methods  to Chinese cities remains  highly contested. 
What is the chance then that urban design methods  will be 
successfully applied to the more complex circumstances of 
rural areas?  Indeed, is there even a conceptual counterpart 
to urban design that can be applied to issues of rural form 
transformation in China? 
In considerations of form transformation, issues of typol- 
ogy, urban morphology, and their derivatives typically provide 
a starting point, and as a method of analysis they have previ- 
ously been introduced  to China.24   But in China their applica- 
tion has been limited largely to urban districts with relatively 
stable histories and continuous records of form evolution 
because the often random,  external and deterministic influ- 
ences upon Chinese rural areas limit the usefulness of these 
methods.   Furthermore, their largely descriptive nature may 
not be helpful in addressing  the fluidity of social and cul- 
tural factors.25    A potential breakthrough can be seen in the 
pioneering  work of a group of Chinese researchers who have 
sought to connect the problem of changing form to the para- 
digm of Chinese political economy by following the works of 
Marx, Lefebvre, and Harvey.26   They have thus sought to de- 
scribe form transformation as the result of the social produc- 
tion of space within a particularly Chinese political/economic 
context.  Unfortunately, their work to date has solely focused 
on cities, and none of them has yet to develop a way to explain 
real mechanisms of spatial production  in a way that can in- 
spire design and decision-making processes. 
Such solely professional and disciplinary approaches are 
also less influential when viewed against the entirety of the 
urbanization process, which involves the coexistence of many 
powerful stakeholders.   This raises a number of crucial ques- 
tions.  What is the true big picture?  If not design, what are 
the dominant forces driving rural form transformation? How 
are these forces working with and against each other?  How 
does this create a multilayered structure of meaning?  And 
how do these forces intersect with issues of tradition? 
Confronting such issues will require that designers re- 
form their operational epistemology.  That is, they will need to 
break with stereotypes and radically engage with knowledge 
from outside.  Before any design work commences, this means 
adopting an inclusive socio-spatial stance and recognizing ru- 
ral form transformation as the outcome of the social produc- 
tion of space.  Formal design is only one part in this process. 
A contextual analytical approach to the “production of space” 
is thus essential for designers, because it will help clarify how 
underlying mechanisms are driven by dynamic forces. 
	
	
A C U S TO M I Z E D A N A LY T I C A L A P P R O A C H TO T H E 
“ P R O D UC T I O N OF S PA C E” 
	
The term “production of space” originated with Henri Lefeb- 
vre’s criticisms of town planning  theory.  He argued that the 
lack of “an epistemology of planning” resulted in “peculiar 
divergencies in the elaboration and interpretation of facts.” 
He thus called for a political understanding of space, one 
that recognized it as a social and political production.27   Lefe- 
bvre argued that space is a fundamental component of the 
capitalist mode of production  and social domination, not an 
innocent  backdrop or neutral material substratum.28   And he 
suggested that “the production  of space can be likened to the 
production  of any particular type of merchandise.”29 
To relate this view to rural areas of China and establish 
the “production of space” as an analytical mode requires 
understanding contextual processes and procedures.   Taking 
into account the related stakeholders  against the backdrop 
of “Chinese characteristics” and dissecting the interrelation- 
ships between them, this report assumes  this process operates 
mainly in one direction.  That is, it is directed by local govern- 
ment from the top down, with public funds, private capital, 
or sometimes a mix of the two being invested into the rural 
built environment.  The result is the production  and supply 
of physical space through  the operation of “land finance” as a 
mechanism of the socialist market economy, or through  other 
actions by local government to fulfill national political respon- 
sibilities such as rural revitalization.30   From the bottom-up, lo- 
cal people then receive or consume  the produced space, adjust- 
ing their everyday life to these top-down forces.  The designer, 
meanwhile, is situated in the “middle,” being either employed 
by a larger entity or self-employed, limited by regulatory 
frameworks or liberated to pursue an individual vision, and 
offering instrumental knowledge to the production  process. 
Interestingly,  this structure responds  fairly accurately to 
the dialectical relationship of social space articulated by 
Lefebvre. In this view, the top (logic) speaks of representation 
of space (conceived space); the bottom (people) inhabits repre- 






f i g u r e  3 .  The analytical model used here to 
understand the transformation of space in Huizhou 
according to three perspectives and Lefebvre’s 
framework for understanding  the “production of 





























the negotiators, connecting  the conceived and lived through 
spatial practice (perceived space).31    As a result, an analytical 
mode with three levels can be constructed,  with the top-down 
driving force as the supplier of space that is conceived, the 
bottom-up local community as the receiver and occupier of the 
conceived space, and the middle level as the designer of space 
that is first perceived, and also conceived and lived in ( f i g . 3 ) . 
	
	
T H E P R O D U C T I O N O F S PA C E I N H U I Z H O U 
	
Huizhou is located in southern Anhui province in east China 
( f i g . 4 ) . It has been a distinct cultural region for more than 
a thousand years, and its people share a united and profound 
tradition and culture.  Huizhou was also once a united ad- 
ministrative  region, in which six traditional counties (She, 
Yi, Wuyuan, Qimen, Xiuning, and Jixi) formed a single state. 
However, the Huizhou region was administratively broken 
apart in modern  era, and in 1987 the city of Huangshan es- 
tablished, largely incorporating the areas of ancient She, Yi, 
Qimen and Xiuning, while Jixi and Wuyuan were attached to 
other adjacent cities. 
Nowadays, Huangshan City, which includes several 
UNESCO World Heritage sites, is famous for tourism.32   For 
decades its local government motto has been “to better play 
Huangshan card, to better compose Huizhou literature,” a 
saying reputedly adapted from a comment by the former Chi- 
nese leader Deng Xiaoping after he visited the area in 1979.33 
Its meaning  is thus to celebrate the role of Huangshan Moun- 
tain and compose a strong Huizhou mentality, as reflected in 
local traditions and identities. 
In the past forty years, while Huizhou has remained a 
cultural region with a strong sense of identity and tradition, 
like many other historic rural areas, it has experienced chal- 
lenges in terms of development and the transformation of 
its physical settlement forms.  These have been exacerbated 
by insensitive and often ill-conceived development projects 
and by conditions of history and geography (as a mountain- 
ous area Huizhou has limited developable land and weak 
rural industries). In contrast, other comparable areas, such 
as Suzhou — which has followed a different economic tra- 
jectory since 1980 (sometimes  referred to as the Southern 
Jiangsu Model) — have seized opportunities to move beyond 
agriculture as a main driver of local GDP.34    Today, however, 
the close proximity of Huizhou to the developed cities of the 
Yangtze River Delta has made it a prime target for new capital 
flows.35   Changes in spatial production  here thus present a 
fascinating and important case study of the changing rural 
environment at a time of political transition. 
To analyze the changing formal structure of towns and 
villages in Huizhou and the forces behind it, this report fo- 
cuses on two aspects of the local production  of space.  Both 
 






f ig ure  4 .  The cultural region of 






















aspects relate to housing, the area of the built environment 
that has experienced the most fundamental change and had 
the most significant impact on people’s lives. One involves 
the incremental development of new residential districts at the 
edges of Huizhou’s larger towns; the other involves relocation 
and renovation activities that have altered the character of its 
existing inventory of residential structures across all levels of 
settlement. Admittedly, other aspects of form change, such as 
new industrial  and commercial development, have also had an 
impact.  But in rural areas like Huizhou these have not proven 
to be as significant drivers of change as they have been in cities. 
	
	
N E W R E S I D E N T I A L D I S T R I C T S — B U I L D I N G C H A N G E 
B Y I N CRE M E N T S 
	
The incremental production  of new residential districts in 
Huizhou has been driven by two population trends.  One is a 
movement  from rural settlements to apartment living, which 
has involved the relocation of people from traditional settle- 
ments to new gated communities composed of uniformly 
designed modern  buildings.  Most such districts have been 
built with the help of private capital on the outskirts of the 
central towns in each of Huizhou’s counties, in a pattern sim- 
ilar to that evident in larger cities.  The second trend is one of 
replacement as betterment, involving the replacement of older 
traditional houses in outlying towns and villages with modern 
terraced housing.  This has created new regulated but nongated 
communities, most of which have been built with public funds. 
Together, these two trends are creating a new regulated 
and monotonous settlement pattern that ignores the traditional 
environment and rejects continuity with the past.  A number of 
social and physical constructs have contributed  to the genealo- 
gy of this new model, among which are the neighborhood unit, 
the Soviet mikroyayon, the work unit, the people’s commune, 
the modern  urban residential district, and the ideal of moder- 
nity and efficiency.36   Most importantly, however, this genealo- 
gy reveals how problems relating to space within contemporary 
rural Huizhou have largely been inherited  from cities.37 
New gated communities began to appear in Huizhou 
after the housing system reform in 1998, with most being the 
direct result of efforts by local governments to pay for their 
operations using the mechanism of “land finance.”  The rela- 
tively weak status of rural industry in the area meant this was 
a better way to generate revenue, particularly as geographic 
conditions made easily developable land for new construction 
scarce.  But this has now come to pose a challenge to shrink- 
ing traditional settlements potentially greater than the migra- 
tion of rural residents  to cities ( f i g . 5 ) . 
By contrast, the development of nongated communities 
in outlying towns began under new rural policies after 2003. 
The political logic here has been more complex and mixed, 
despite the critique by some scholars that it is simply based 
on squeezing  land quotas out of rural villages for commercial 
use by pushing  for “replacement” homes.38 
In Huizhou, the development of nongated communities 
has been supported  politically using a shallow rhetoric of cul- 
tural tradition.  A prime example can be seen in the town of 
“XG” in She county, where a new district of unified terraced 
houses was recently built ( f i g . 6 ) .39   The aesthetic of the XG 
project attempted  to reflect tradition, but this unfortunately 
took the largely superficial form of adapting the matouqiang (a 
tall wall used to prevent fire and theft) to modern  buildings. 
The matouqiang is one of the most iconic symbols of Huizhou 
architecture  and can be found in almost every residential dis- 
trict in this new context ( f i g . 7 ) . However, it has here been 
“copied” cosmetically as little more than a decorative feature 






f i g u r e  5 .  A gated community 
in Huizhou  showing the use of 
matouqiang as a roof decoration. 
























The long, narrow community to the south of XG was 
developed on a piece of abandoned,  nonarable  land along the 
river.40    It was intended  for people from various backgrounds, 
including those from nearby mountain villages with ex- 
tremely harsh living environments, those whose old houses 
had been demolished  due to the expansion of the town, other 
local people who wanted to move to an improved living envi- 
ronment, and still others who were too poor to afford a house. 
According to Mr. H, a local governor who is still in charge of 
this project, there was great demand  for the project.  As he 
explained, “We had to develop something here by ‘Building 
a New Socialist Countryside,’ as XG had stood still for many 
years, and the local people were looking forward to it, and 






















f i g u r e  6 .  The regulated layout 
of the newly built district in the 
southern area of XG town. The 
buildings on the other side of river 
show the traditional layout of 
buildings in the town. Photo by 
author. 
 








f i g u r e  7 .  Matouqiang on the roof of a regulated gated community in 
the town center. Photo by author. 
	
	
Ostensibly, because the sale of rural collective land is 
prohibited by law, the new XG community could not be a com- 
mercial, for-profit development.  However, during the planning 
process Mr. H said several adjustments had to be made.  “As we 
lacked funds, we had to introduce private investment.  But this 
did not involve a sale, as the developer would only build base- 
ments, and then ‘transfer’ them to the locals by market rules. 
It was a subtle innovation, and it was approved by the superior 
leaders.”  To produce this increment of new housing the local 
government therefore had to strike a balance between obtain- 
ing funding for the project and following the letter of the law, 
all in pursuit of its underlying aim to retain people in the coun- 
tryside and slow, or even reverse, the movement  to big cities. 
The success of this multifaceted relationship was also not 
indicative of the more general unreliability of local processes, 
in which uncertainty  may be generated by technical errors 
and institutional inefficiencies.  Indeed, the management of 
residential projects in rural areas like Huizhou has lagged 
far behind the management of similar projects in cities.  For 
example, grey areas in the vague “meritocratic” mode of local 
public administration have allowed ambitious  local leaders 
to make individual judgements that violate planning  regu- 
lations.42   Such decisions are typically driven by personal 
ambition for promotion,  which is largely determined by as- 
sessments of local GDP.  But the uncertainty  that results has 
become a significant factor in the consistency of planning  for 
rural development.  In one case, the site of a proposed bus sta- 
tion was even moved suddenly in violation of a local planning 
decision, resulting in the failure of a residential and commer- 
cial development already under construction adjacent to the 
proposed station. 
At a very grassroots level, however, such motivated lead- 
ership can have its advantages.  Indeed, in the case of XG, Mr. 
H’s years of work were greatly appreciated by the local people, 
who were given the opportunity to contribute  democratically 
to decisions.  The local people had known H for a long time, 
and they trusted him.  As he said, “Every decision was agreed 
by raising hands in household-level meetings.”43 
Access to capital has been another significant factor in 
the quality of rural incremental space production.   Typically, 
investors in such projects are not as professional as they are 
in larger cities; considering  their inexperience, naivete or 
greed has also often led to unexpected problems.  One such 
investor, Mr. C, funded a local residential project with the 
proceeds of closing his local factory ten years earlier.  As he 
recalled, “Before then I did not know the whole process at all, 
and I purchased  some land with zero infrastructure, causing 
huge problems afterwards.  Quick design without pertinent 
research also resulted in many unreasonable house types that 
were difficult to sell to the locals.”44 
Meanwhile, it is rare to find any investor willing to put 
money into a nongated community like the one at XG. One 
such investor signed on only after lobbying by local gover- 
nors.  But his financial interest in the project seemed ques- 
tionable, and his position as head of a business  association 
hinted that he might have been ready to sacrifice some profits 
in return  for other considerations. 
As the receivers of new development, the local people, 
however, have shown great willingness to accept changes in 
the physical environment.  In most cases they see change as 
positive, contradicting  the prevailing view that nostalgia for 
older patterns of settlement would leave them unsatisfied with 
the new places being created.  Asked how they understood 
the reasons for what was being built, they tended to start their 
personal narratives by telling about their own choices rather 
than the reality that new housing types were being “imposed” 
on them.  When asked about the role of government, they also 
suggested that “to develop” was a shared concept, and that “a 
place must develop, especially rural places like here.” 
Others commented that “the change is just the develop- 
ment,” and that “my choice of moving just conforms to the 
rural development.”45   However, most did not even mention 
the “design” of the new housing, just as the significance of 
“design” as a variable was generally not well acknowledged. 
The local people instead seem benefit motivated, having 
made choices they believe fit their interests.  And, in effect, 
this outcome has been realized through  a largely socialist 
economy.  Yet those who have chosen to move to commer- 
cial gated communities are clearly engaged in competitive 
consumption. And those who have moved to new, nongated 
public communities in villages have likewise engaged in a 
market-driven system.  Indeed, in XG, there is a supplemen- 
tary distribution method whose unofficial rule is that those 
who pay more receive a higher level of amenities. 
As people have become more aware of the “unevenness” 
in living standards  in China, a new mentality has appeared 
among the rural population, which now aspires to a “better 
life” similar to that of urban dwellers.46   Moving to a new resi- 






possible.  Interviews with residents also reveal they are satisfied 
with these new physical environments.  Indeed, they now prior- 
itize striving for conceptual “evenness” — for example, through 
better education, work, entertainment, etc. — something they 
could not previously have attained in rural settlements. 
In the collective mind, quality of place thus has been tem- 
porarily replaced by position of place, allowing people to con- 
sciously or unconsciously adjust their everyday practices to new 
dwelling forms and the modified conditions of living that come 
with their new environments.47    Examples of such activities 
include square-dancing organized in vacant lots, after-school 
clubs and night schools held in apartment rooms, urban farm- 
ing on balconies and decks, additional parking areas created 
in unused  spaces, e-shopping express stations, rented garages 
upgraded into homes for migrants,  and even small sewing 
factories in unused  ground-level shop spaces.  The availability 
of public space, which designers often cite as a problem in cit- 
ies, is also not an issue here due to the flexibility of residents 
in adapting any unused  places to suit their needs.  And being 
in a rural location, there is abundant open green space near- 
by. People thus seem to have unwittingly participated in the 
“urban design” process by creating their own public places. 
Following the move to new types of settlement, accep- 
tance, adjustment and modification appear to be the silent 
themes of everyday life. And conflicts between residents  and 
migrants  were not found to be as common  in comparison 
to cities, as most of the population have a rural background, 
which enables a higher level of tolerance and understanding. 
Indeed, when asked about issues of tradition with regard to 
their changed living environment, most residents spoke of re- 
constructing elements of tradition in their imaginations.48   In- 
terestingly, some residents have actually also revived traditional 
Huizhou settings inside their new apartment homes, in a 
process similar to what Duanfang Lu has called the “latency of 
tradition.”49   When questioned  about whether they would even- 
tually like to move back to a more rural area, most expressed 
a desire to do so, and some had even built new houses in their 
home villages. But their emotional attachment to traditional 
values is somewhat vague, and when questioned  further, some 
indicated they may have been motivated by the increasing 
value of land as a consequence of ongoing rural revitalization. 
For the designers of developments  in these rural en- 
vironments there are a number of significant challenges, 
including regulatory limitations,  lower fees for their services, 
and a general lack of recognition and appreciation of their 
work.  Indeed, in the design of gated communities around 
town centers, designers are largely confined by the statutory 
planning  system, which presents  them with detailed regula- 
tions covering all aspects of their work — from master plan- 
ning (urban master plan), to development control (detailed 
development control plan), to construction details (detailed 
constuction  plan).  This is not dissimilar to the process gov- 
erning comparable developments  in cities.50   Typically, urban 
planners  are thus instructed  by local governments to arrange 
new blocks to enable the expansion of town centers ( f i g . 8 ) . 
This leaves architects with the job of filling in the blanks, 
while limiting their design options through  numerous rules 
and subjecting them to design changes from powerful politi- 
cal and financial interests. 
This situation has improved somewhat recently in cities, 
as the importance of “urban design” has gradually come to be 
accepted.  But it is still problematic to integrate urban design 
concepts such as public space, connectivity, neighborhoods, 























f i g u r e  8 .  The prospect master plan 
of She county. The white blocks are all 
for residential districts. Courtesy of the 
construction committee of She county. 
 







f i g u r e  9 .  The urban and rural 
planning system of China based on 
the 2007 Urban and Rural Planning 
Law. The areas outside cities (rural 
areas) defined in this paper include 
towns, townships and villages. 


















tial blocks are literally seen as blocks, with no consideration for 
the relationship between them and the spaces created around 
them.  And to date there has been no integrated urban design 
consideration given to the larger issue of rural form transfor- 
mation in Huizhou. Indeed, in the recently expired 2007 du- 
al-track planning  system, town centers were treated the same 
as cities, while the land around them was treated as a rural 
area, subject to entirely different regulations  — thus creating a 
conflict with the very idea of urban-rural integration  ( f i g . 9 ) . 
Confinement by an overly strict system of regulations, 
however, cannot fully account for poor design outcomes. 
For example, in the case of XG, compared to town centers, 
there were much fewer planning  regulations.   This raises 
a key question: Why was it designed the way it was? Closer 
scrutiny reveals that the designers were treated more like an 
instrument than a consultant  by the top-down forces behind 
its construction. Decisions about style and form were there- 
fore largely out of their hands.  As a result, “copy and paste” 
stereotypes of a superficial Hui style typically dominate  the 
aesthetic of these new developments.52 
	
	
R E L O C AT I O N A N D R E N O VAT I O N — C H A N G E S TO T H E 
E X I S T IN G H O U SIN G IN V E N T OR Y 
	
Compared to the production  of space through  the develop- 
ment of new residential districts, changes to the form and 
use of existing buildings and spaces in Huizhou has not been 
as evident.  Despite the great amount  of such work, such de- 
velopment has maintained a relatively low profile, despite cre- 
ating significant changes in an evolutionary manner. These 
form changes have a number of common  characteristics: they 
are slow in pace, cheap in terms of investment, unconcentrat- 
ed in distribution, inconsistent in terms of process, un-uni- 
fied in design, and focused on individual buildings and small 
districts.  However, for these same reasons, the changes may 
have an effect that is more radical and thorough,  because they 
have created an increasingly fragmented condition that looms 
over the traditional built environment. 
Relocation and renovation are the two main themes driv- 
ing these developments  in Huizhou. Relocation has been 
seen as a way to conserve ancient buildings and traditional 
settlements, and it was pursued,  particularly between 2009 
and 2014, under the policy of “Bai cun qian zhuang [To protect 
one hundred villages and one thousand buildings].”53   This 
effort was intended  to provide a national model for how to use 
market forces to assist local governments in fulfilling their 
conservation responsibilities. Yet, even though the order to 
protect and conserve such structures was pushed from the top 
down, it was expected that funds would be raised locally from 
various public and private sources.  According to this policy, 
buildings and settlements could be protected, leased or ad- 
opted in their original environments by new owners, or even 
relocated to other places ( f i g s . 1 0 – 1 1 ) . Numerous problems 
have emerged as a result of this effort, with “relocation” being 
the most controversial.54   For example, in the name of protec- 
tion, single ancient buildings or groups of buildings have 
sometimes been relocated and reassembled into new “tradi- 
tional settlements.”  One historic structure was even famously 
transplanted overseas, as a “unwitting cultural ambassador.”55 
By contrast, renovation has been more of a bottom-up 
process aimed at rebuilding  and adapting rural buildings to 
new functions  or to revitalize villages, closely following the 
national campaign of rural revitalization.  However, in many 
such cases local governments have taken a back seat, with- 






f i g u r e  1 0 .  A newly built 
“traditional settlement” near 
Huangshan city center. Ancient 
buildings have been relocated from 
other places and assembled here. 
The development is located along 
a river, to the south of a gated 


















f i g u r e  1 1 .  The bird’s-eye 
view of the same newly built 
“traditional settlement” in Figure 
10.  Within the relocated ancient 
buildings there are shops, tea 
houses, restaurants, bars, hotels, 





















Instead, they have sought to control, manage, regulate and 
service such efforts merely by setting policies with regard to 
changes in the existing stock of built spaces. 
Because Huizhou is a region with few strong industries 
apart from tourism,  changes to the existing building inven- 
tory have also been fairly subtle.  Nevertheless, the impor- 
tance of creating a tourism  brand has caused various form 
problems related to the desire to create a nostalgic image of 
Huizhou’s traditions and culture.  With this in mind outside 
designers have come to local villages with their own visions 
of change, and these have largely been supported  by the local 
population, who see these projects as a great opportunity to 
make a fortune through  development.  As a result there has 
been a boom in the conversion of existing structures into ru- 
ral inns, museums, studios, and clubs.  But there have been 
few attempts coordinate such efforts through  the application 
of holistic and systematic guidelines inspired by contextual 






space and its continued  ability to sustain the needs of the lo- 
cal population have often been neglected. 
“Land finance,” or the need to generate revenue for lo- cal 
government directly from the development process, has also 
not been a key objective in these projects.56   Instead, the ability 
of such new properties and ventures to generate tax revenue 
has become pivotal in local government policies and decision-
making.  Innovative market-oriented measures have also been 
manipulated to ensure financial benefits for local 
governments.  Thus, in both relocation and renovation, funds 
and investments have been raised from diverse channels  to 
support government policies at different levels. For example, 
the official act spelling out the national policy of “Bai cun qian 
zhuang” specifically mentions that an important principle of 
implementation is 
	
. . . to insist on a combination of government leadership 
and market operation. . . . Meanwhile, market aware- 
ness and discipline should be enhanced, and market 
methods should be utilized to brand the project, to carry 
out investment attracting promotion, to highlight the 
main force of marketization.57 
	
Language setting out this same principle can also be found in 
the “Implementation Plan for Activating the Idle Houses  and 
Related Land in She County”: 
	
. . . to support the collective economic organization or its 
individual members to make active the idle houses and 
lands by self-run, leasing, sharing and cooperation. To 
promote transformations as resources to properties, 
money to capital, villagers to shareholders . . . to support 
villagers returning from cities, people from cities, gradu- 
ates, veterans to develop rural tourist associations, rural 
cooperation bodies, family farms, rural guesthouses. . . .58 
	
The political role of local government in this program of 
space production  is therefore both to protect the built en- 
vironment  and to revitalize the whole rural area.  To fulfill 
mandated policies from the top down, local governments 
have thus tried to encourage multiple players to participate 
from the bottom up.  And they have sought to do this by ma- 
nipulating  the meanings of rural land rights and by authoriz- 
ing experimental  exchanges of rights between the collective 
and private spheres. 
As mentioned, this effort has dovetailed with a diversi- 
fication of funding sources.  The previous fixed single mean- 
ing of rural collective land rights has therefore been split 
into three: a right of ownership, a right of qualification, and a 
right of use.59   Ownership  of rural land must thus still be held 
by a collective organization,  but the right of use has been 
liberated to be sold into the market.  Meanwhile, the right of 
qualification still belongs to villagers to ensure their interests 
in the activation of rural land. 
 
	
f i g u r e  1 2 .  The nonsensical addition of matouqiang on the street 
side of buildings as the result of the gai hui policy. These buildings were 




An associated ideology of tradition also remains  tied to 
these projects.  Yet, compared to the ability to oversee 
concentrated  incremental form changes, it has been harder 
to create an official narrative of Huizhou identity through 
them because they are scattered and transient. Nevertheless, 
the local governments have tried to exert full control over 
the process.  This contested situation can be best illustrated 
in the movement  called gai hui, which means “changing to 
the Hui style.”60   In its application, gai hui requires that any 
building seen from a main road that is not in Hui style must 
be changed by adding matouqiang to its roof ( f i g . 1 2 ) . This 
attempt to revive local identity only in terms of facade appear- 
ance lacks any sense of authentic  purpose, and yet significant 
funding has been allocated to it, with often controversial re- 
sults.  Interestingly,  a retired local official involved in gai hui 
commented that: 
	
It was totally a surface movement and to some extent 
only symbolic. The government paid a large bill, but 
the locals did not buy it, and corruptions and contra- 
dictions also happened, with the result being useless to 
the forming of Huizhou  identity. We need to be more 
confident and honest to the tradition, as well as to the 
historical conditions. . . .61 
	
In contrast to conditions in more affluent and developed 
coastal regions, a lack of local government funds (due, as 
mentioned, to a lack of industrial  and commercial activity) 
has certainly restricted opportunities and abilities for change 
in Huizhou. As such, policy implementation processes still 
operate like “separated local situated movements,”  aimed at 
fulfilling “the national movement.”  Overlaps and contradic- 
tions are thus common  in the absence of an overarching 
platform for coordination.   For example, the national “Con- 






rural infrastructure development and has included work to 
improve water systems, recycling efforts, and road networks. 
But construction related to these efforts has often been dam- 
aging to traditional landscapes and places cherished by “Bai 
cun qian zhuang.”62    Other policies are similarly vague, such 
as those governing relocation.  Indeed, in cases where no 
clear criteria have been established for the selection of build- 
ings to be moved, the result has often been the demolition of 
other valuable ancient buildings.63 
In addition, social sustainability has not been well 
considered from the top down.  For example, considerable 
discrepancies  exist between the real needs of the local popu- 
lation and grand discourses and causes.64   Meanwhile, design 
values have been oversimplified by governments at the same 
time that no comprehensive rural design guide has been pro- 
duced to influence activities across the entire area. 
The government’s desire to secure capital from diverse 
channels  has also made it possible for anyone to become an 
investor.  From professionals  to novices, from local people 
and collectives to outsiders and even solo designers, a great 
variety of people have seized the opportunity to “lead” proj- 
ects.  For example, a significant number of investors have 
been attracted to Xi Xi Nan, a township adjacent to the newly 
built Huangshan CRH high-speed rail station.  Indeed, de- 
spite its situation next to the CRH, it has become a model 
for rural revitalization in Huizhou. Here, many locals have 
altered, rebuilt or extended houses into guesthouses, inns and 
cafes.  Other ancient buildings have meanwhile  been leased 
to outsiders, who have unsympathetically renovated them into 
private museums, studios, tea houses, etc. ( f i g . 1 3 ) . In one 
case, an old office building, the town hall, and an old primary 
school have been packaged as “Turenscape Academy” by a 
landscape design group from Beijing.  They operate the facili- 
ty as a mixed business  development of studios and academies, 
a rural inn, and catering outlets.65   As Mr. L, the manager  and 
designer of another boutique hotel nearby, cautioned: 
	
We were interior designers from big cities specialized in 
premium hotels. But around 2014, we felt our design 
business had touched the glass ceiling, so we tried to 
avoid the intensifying competition in cities and started 
to look for opportunities  in villages.  It is also a dream 
for us to escape the busy life for a while and to be our 
own client in such a beautiful place, and we later dis- 
covered our choice fits the national strategy of rural 
revitalization. . . . However, apart from our initial af- 
fection for the rural, profit logic and a long-term market 
plan is still the key for our sustainability.66 
	
The meaning  of “local people” is also often not what it 
appears to be.  Some who make this claim are not local at all, 
and many real locals have been forced or tempted out of their 
original homes.  Indeed, in “relocation” projects it is hard to 
find any real locals. Most new assembled traditional settle- 
ments are not even used for housing, and the new operators 
of their buildings may all be from outside the local area. 
Even in renovation projects within traditional villages, 
original residents  and outside investors may be co-residents. 
Interestingly,  in such cases the practice of everyday life 
among the original inhabitants may be barely changed due to 
their relatively stable environment.  However, the underlying 


















f i g u r e  1 3 .  A boutique hotel 
in Xi Xi Nan, which was renovated 
from an idle, newly built house 
that was “oversupplied” as the 
result of “Building a New Socialist 
Countryside.”  This is a better 
case, as it was not renovated from 
ancient buildings.  Photo courtesy 






f i g ure  1 4 .  A revived traditional 
ritual called “long table banquet” in 
Xu village in She county is held only 
for tourists in early summer.  Photo 
























shift to cater to the tastes and expectations of tourists.  Thus, 
in many Huizhou villages, local people still hold traditional 
rituals, but the events are often staged for “consumers,”  not 
themselves ( f i g . 1 4 ) . On ordinary days vendors may be seen 
walking around selling their wares to tourists.  And while vil- 
lage elders may still gather and gossip in small open places, 
they immediately become ticket sellers or tour guides when 
visitors arrive. 
Designers have been liberated or even indulged to 
produce their own fanciful visions in many such new devel- 
opments.   Thus, where “relocation” may confine them to a 
designated area, “renovation” within an existing village may 
offer a dreamland, free of effective restrictions.67   Here, they 
can be client, investor and designer all at once, while simulta- 
neously claiming to solve local problems.  However, the result 
of their work is often to impose their experience from cities 
onto the rural setting without any consideration of local com- 
plexities and contradictions.68 
Zhou Rong has concluded that there are three main pos- 
sible streams of design activity in rural China.69   Two of these 
are present in Huizhou. Culturally, filled with nostalgia, de- 
signers have looked back in their projects, endeavoring to echo 
all aspects of the Huizhou traditional architecture  — from 
space, form, materials, and colors to construction details.  But 
these fantastic dreams, which they could never build in cities, 
cannot often be appreciated by the local people.  Meanwhile, 
technically, the use of local materials in ecological and tectoni- 
cally appropriate ways has indeed been practical and sustain- 
able.  But an overemphasis on irrelevant, “low-tech” solutions 
sometimes deemphasizes real spatial qualities ( f i g . 1 5 ) . 
The third approach to design, one that integrates social 
and spatial factors — and which might be the most appropriate 
approach to renovation as part of a campaign of rural revitaliza- 
tion — is almost entirely absent, however.  Using this approach 
it might be possible for designers to reconstruct rural places by 
linking space design to emerging  new social structures. But 
such an effort to reform and revitalize rural communities, 
and thereby nurture local identities and promote social sus- 







f i g u r e  1 5 .  An old primary school remodeled into a hotel in Xi Xi 
Nan.  The classrooms were updated into hotel rooms, and a curtain of 
bamboo poles was added to the facade, which deteriorated after several 






f i g u r e  1 6 .  One continuous 
traditional place remains in the 
southern part of the central town 
of She county. But it is challenged 
by the rural form transformation. 





















Efforts at replacement and renovation thus have placed 
too great a focus on single buildings, and this has resulted 
in a tendency to disregard the larger design value inherent 
to Huizhou’s rural places.  This design attitude is similar in 
many ways to that evident in Chinese cities, where singular 
attention to individual blocks and plots has failed to result 
in an integrated and contextually responsive environment. 
These traditional places, where form elements  are continu- 
ous, where an understanding of typology and morphology 
could be usefully applied, are facing growing challenges, as 
the value of place and continuity has been disregarded  in fa- 
vor of a new and often anarchistic designs ( f i g . 1 6 ) . 
	
	
C O N C L U S I O N : A M O R E A C T I V E R O L E F O R D E S I G N 
	
By adopting an analytical approach based on Henri Lefebvre’s 
ideas concerning  the “production of space,” this report has 
sought to understand the mechanisms underlying the trans- 
formation of traditional rural form in Huizhou. Specifically, 
it has sought to illuminate  rural form transformation on 
three levels — through  the intentions of those on the supply 
side, through  the reactions to new spaces by receivers, and 
through  the situations  faced by space designers.  It has thus 
shown how local realities related to the implementation of 
“Socialism with Chinese characteristics” have largely com- 
promised  the former contextual production  of space. 
From the top-down, in promoting  a logic of conceived 
space, economically, the power of government has sought 
above all to generate revenue from rural development.  Early 
on, the effect and impact of “land finance” policies were 
strong in this regard, but other revenue-generation methods, 
such as tax collection, have now become more important, 
reflecting a shift from form growth to form management.71 
Meanwhile, politically, local government has also had to com- 
ply with a series of national policies aimed at enhancing rural 
development and population stability.  And, ideologically, a 
native Huizhou mentality has come into conflict with a na- 
tional narrative of cultural confidence, creating anxiety within 
local government when it comes to finding a proper rhetoric of 
Huizhou tradition and identity.72 
In terms of entrepreneurship, the role of local govern- 
ment has also deepened and intensified.  Yet, at the same 
time, local government has often also lacked effective manage- 
ment to ensure consistent  quality and sometimes been will- 
ing to accept the flawed outcomes of paternalistic leadership. 
Significantly, these weaknesses have tended to compromise 
design-side aspirations  and resulted in questionable  physical 
realities.  The voice of capital has also been discordant, partly 
because it has been relatively easier for inexperienced inves- 
tors and developers with inappropriate or shortsighted motiva- 
tions to engage in spatial production  than in urban areas. 
From a bottom-up perspective, meanwhile,  many locals 
have “voted with their feet” and accepted the move into new 
residential districts on the edges of Huizhou’s larger towns. 
They have also willingly engaged in the spatial appropria- 
tion of new environments in villages. However, consciously 
or subconsciously, their everyday lives have been greatly 
changed as they have adopted and adapted to these new envi- 
ronments. Indeed, as Xin Liu has commented: “people know 
why they do this or that, they also know how to do this or 
that, but they do not know what they do does.”73 
At the middle level, designers have alternately been con- 






space production  in Huizhou. But as part of their discovery 
of new rural opportunities, they have tended to transfer forms 
and design approaches from cities without a thorough  under- 
standing  of the complicated mechanisms in play. Unfortu- 
nately, this has too often resulted in the creation of places that 
lack true meaning  (or even a sense of belonging) within their 
cultural context.  And this condition has only been exacerbat- 
ed by a lack of integrated design guidelines that describe and 
advocate for the specific characteristics  of rural form. 
In Huizhou, the reality today is that the various motiva- 
tions and expectations of the three levels of stakeholders  in 
the process of rural development are incredibly diverse — 
and yet they coexist in the same “production of space.”  This 
report has attempted  to analyze and outline the intentions, 
dilemmas,  and potential solutions inherent in this process 
from the perspective of each of these groups.  And it has at- 
tempted to show how its outcome has been a compromised 
condition that also reflects the features of “Socialism with 
Chinese characteristics” — itself is a compromise between 
capitalism and socialism. 
As a result of this compromised condition, the built 
traditions of Huizhou have clearly been diminished. Specifi- 
cally, an overall sense of built tradition is being fragmented 
because the larger environment that enables the maintenance 
of a sense of authenticity is being changed discontinuously. 
In new residential districts, tradition has thus been both 
interrupted and partially revived under new conditions.74 
In “relocation” projects, it has been “deliberately choreo- 
graphed.”75    And in “renovation” efforts it has been deployed 
to cater to new patrons through  manufactured objects of con- 
sumption.76   As part of this process of spatial production,  lo- 
cal governments have come to see tradition as a cultural sym- 
bol, while investors see it as a label and a brand.  To the local 
population, the Huizhou tradition is more of a silent lifestyle. 
And for designers it provides conceptual justification for a 
broad range of personal, stylistic responses. 
Confronted  by this compromised situation, designers 
could and should play a stronger role by advocating solu- 
tions that are less superficial and self-referential.  If design- 
ers were to return  to a more traditional role as negotiators 
within a larger cultural process, they might, in Lefebvrian 
terms, help link conceived space to lived space by creating 
perceived space.77    On the one hand, by creating high-quality 
rural places as environmental activators, they might help fix 
the problem of capital flow by promoting  the appreciation of 
rural properties and improving local incomes and lives.78   On 
the other, they might help promote sustainable  contextual 
design values — for example, by filling the current void for 
systematic guides for rural design.  Such a sensitive approach 
could nurture social awareness and raise the profile of design 
values in rural areas and make a significant difference to the 
quality of development in Huizhou. 
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